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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The Traditional Courts Bill (TCB) was introduced first in 2008, and then again 
in 2012, to provide post-apartheid recognition and regulation of “traditional” forums 
of dispute resolution. Under apartheid, these forums were governed by the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927 (BAA).1 This statute provided government officials 
with the power to group people into “tribes” and appoint “chiefs” as leaders in a 
separate system of governance for the black majority.2 Those sections of the BAA 
dealing with so-called “tribal courts” have not yet been repealed.3 The TCB was 
developed to replace this illegitimate regulatory framework and incorporate 
constitutional values such as equality and accountability in the hopes of facilitating 
access to justice for the rural poor.4 To this end, the bill sought to provide “traditional 
courts,” presided over by senior traditional leaders, with the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
certain civil and criminal matters and impose sanctions on people within specific 
geographical areas.5
 Despite its admirable stated objectives, the TCB was met with fierce opposition 
while it was before Parliament from members of the public, civil society, and 
academics.6 Opponents critiqued the bill’s perpetuation of a separate governance 
system for black people,7 lack of protections for women,8 enforcement of unaccountable 
and undemocratic powers for traditional leaders,9 and failure to use living customary 
law as a regulatory starting point for customary courts.10 The TCB was attacked for 
perpetuating, and in some cases intensifying, colonial and apartheid distortions of 
customary law.11 These arguments focused on ways that the bill failed to meaningfully 
ref lect and respond to the needs and vulnerabilities that arise from the diverse 
1. See SA Law Reform Commission Report on the Repeal of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, at 
53 (Mar. 2004) (noting that “[s]ince 1927 tribal government has almost exclusively been governed by the 
BAA.”).
2. Sections 2 and 5 of the Black (Native) Administration Act 38 of 1927, as originally published.
3. Specifically, sections 12 and 20 of the Black (Native) Administration Act 38 of 1927, as amended, still 
remain in force.
4. See Traditional Courts Bill, at pmbl.
5. Id. §§ 4–6, 10.
6. For submissions made by these stakeholders during the various parliamentary processes that dealt with 
the TCB, see Traditional Courts Bill (B1-2012), Parliamentary Monitoring Group, www.pmg.org.
za/bill/159/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) and Focus Areas: Traditional Courts Bill, Ctr. for Law & Soc’y, 
www.cls.uct.ac.za/research/focus/tcb/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). Specific submissions by stakeholders 
will be referenced more fully in Part V of this article.
7. Thuto Thipe, Voices in the Legislative Process: A Report on the Public Submissions on the 
Traditional Courts Bill (2008 and 2012), at 12–18 (2013).
8. Id. at 37–42.
9. Id. at 25–32.
10. Id. at 22–23, 41.
11. Id. at 9–12. 
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contexts in which customary law is practiced around the country.12 Closely linked to 
arguments that the bill’s content was disconnected from living customary law were 
critiques of the procedures used to draft the TCB and deficiencies in the consultation 
process once the bill entered Parliament.13 Living customary law has been framed by 
the Constitutional Court as customary law that is responsive to change and reflects 
the ways in which people practice custom.14 Many of the critiques of the TCB 
consultation process rested on the idea that uneven consultation showed which 
stakeholders were favored by government, since “[o]nly those voices that are heard 
are able to influence the direction, principles and content of legislation.”15 We argue 
that deficiencies around public participation in the bill’s legislative process from 
2012 onwards resulted in a bill that fails to be legitimate for those who practice 
customary law. This piece examines public participation processes surrounding the 
TCB—exploring the constitutional requirements for consultation and the extent to 
which the TCB process met them.
 In Part II, we examine the spirit in which consultation is captured in the 
Constitution and some of the motivations for this inclusion in the context of South 
Africa’s political history. This examination focuses on the political significance of 
public participation in the legislative process and highlights relationships of power 
that necessitate the opening of spaces for different voices to be heard.
 In Part III, we reflect on the South African Law Reform Commission’s (SALRC) 
studies of customary law and how the SALRC developed and conducted consultation 
on “traditional courts and the judicial function of traditional leaders.”16 This forms a 
basis for considering how consultation around customary law has been imagined in 
the past and what steps have been taken to encourage diversity in contributions and 
engagement from different sectors of society.
 In Part IV, we describe briefly the development of the TCB from its introduction 
in the National Assembly in 2008 through its withdrawal from Parliament in 2011 
and its reintroduction in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) in 2012. This 
paper follows the TCB until it lapsed in Parliament in 2014.
 In Part V, we analyze the Constitution’s inclusion of public participation, focusing 
on its significance in the legislative process. This section draws on the Constitution 
and Court decisions to examine the jurisprudential principles that make consultation 
necessary and underpin the imagining of transformative democracy. This analysis 
draws on first-hand accounts of the process to evaluate how the different experiences 
and observations of people compare to the principles of participation and inclusivity 
set forth in South Africa’s legal framework.
12. Id. at 18–25.
13. Id. at 4–9.
14. Living customary law is contrasted with “official” customary law found in textbooks and statutes. See, 
e.g., Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at paras. 87, 110–11, 154–55.
15. Thipe, supra note 7, at 4.
16. SA Law Commission Project 90 Customary Law: Report on Traditional Courts and the Judicial 
Function of Traditional Leaders (Jan. 2003).
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 This piece examines how the privileging of traditional leaders during the drafting 
of the TCB, at the expense of people under their leadership, resulted in a bill that did 
not reflect or protect the needs or interests of the majority. By exploring the legal, 
political, and social motivations behind consultation, this piece identifies the many 
levels at which the failure to facilitate effective public participation threatened to 
undermine the interests of the people who would have been most affected by the 
TCB, and more broadly the very fiber of democracy. When the TCB was reintroduced 
to Parliament in 2012 with no changes from its 2008 form, submissions again 
reflected that people who would be directly affected by the TCB were not adequately 
informed or consulted before it was presented to Parliament.17 The continuing failure 
to meaningfully consult with people over the life of the TCB points to Parliament’s 
deep inadequacies in its engagement with the public on the bill, and, related to this, 
to the development of legislation that is more damaging than constructive to the 
people it is designed to serve.
ii. spirit Of thE COnstitUtiOn: WhY COnsULtatiOn MattErs
 The South African Constitution was born in a moment of political opportunity, 
uncertainty, and hope as the country sought to break from the violence, oppression, 
and inequality of colonial and apartheid rule through the reimagining of the national 
political order. In the spirit of breaking from a past of exclusion and suppression, the 
Constitution requires that Parliament ensure public participation in the legislative 
process.18 The Constitutional Court has further required that such participation be 
“meaningful.”19
 Central to the state’s assertion of power under colonialism and apartheid was the 
epistemic violence that denied and devalued vernacular knowledge and inf licted 
inauthentic and inorganic systems, structures, values, and identities on African 
people.20 Such violence is evident in official representations of customary law, 
through which custom was manipulated to support colonial supremacy that allowed 
the state greater control over African people.21 The constitutional requirement for 
public consultation means that when drafting statutes dealing with custom, legislators 
will receive input from the people who practice and are served by customary law, 
rather than only relying on a damaging “official” misrepresentation of custom.22
17. Thipe, supra note 7, at 4.
18. S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 59, 72, 115–116, 118. 
19. Doctors for Life Int’ l v. Speaker of the Nat’ l Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at paras. 129, 131, 145, 171, 
235.
20. See Paul S. Landau, Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400–1948 (2010).
21. Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism 37–61 (1996).
22. See S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 59, 72, 118. These sections specifically require the legislatures to facilitate 
input on the substance of draft legislation by ordinary members of the public. This does not exclude the 
consideration of “official” customary law texts but enables a broader range of views on the subject matter.
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 Vital to the recognition of people’s knowledge through consultation is the space 
that these processes open for the restoration and protection of human dignity. Sandra 
Liebenberg has explained the significance of public participation in relation to 
human dignity:
A major factor contributing to a sense of powerlessness and lack of autonomy 
is the absence of the opportunity to voice our concerns in relation to decisions 
which have a major impact on our lives. Meaningful participation in decisions 
that affect our lives affirms the close interlinkage between freedom and 
human dignity . . . It not only gives people a sense of control over their lives, 
but it affirms their equal worth as members of a political society.23
Engaging with people about their experience of custom unlocks the potential to 
develop and support expressions of custom that affirm dignity in the use of justice 
systems and allow for substantive alignment with the Constitution. Law that does not 
reflect the realities of the people it serves cannot be expected to protect their interests 
and adequately provide justice. The failure to listen to people from historically 
marginalized groups in the legislative process largely results in the perpetuation of 
power inequalities that limit the realization of rights. Failures in consultation also 
result in static legislation that is deaf to the dynamism of vernacular systems, structures, 
and institutions, which evolve in relation to changes in the groupings where they exist. 
In contrast, listening to diverse views and experiences on the ground promotes 
sensitivity to context and positionality, allowing greater insight into vernacular realities 
and promoting values of accountability, responsiveness, and openness that are central 
to the spirit of the Constitution.24 Justice Sandile Ngcobo explained:
The participation by the public on a continuous basis provides vitality to the 
functioning of representative democracy. It encourages citizens of the country 
to be actively involved in public affairs, identify themselves with the 
institutions of government and become familiar with the laws as they are 
made . . . . It promotes a spirit of democratic and pluralistic accommodation 
calculated to produce laws that are likely to be widely accepted and effective 
in practice. It strengthens the legitimacy of legislation in the eyes of the 
people. Finally, because of its open and public character it acts as a 
counterweight to secret lobbying and inf luence peddling. Participatory 
democracy is of special importance to those who are relatively disempowered 
in a country like ours where great disparities of wealth and influence exist.25
Public participation is both practical and symbolic in the conceptualization of South 
Africa’s democracy. An examination of the material impact of public participation 
demonstrates that the Constitution’s emphasis on consultation is not a rhetorical 
device, or only relevant to representation, but serves as a tool for substantively 
influencing policy to give it life and legitimacy in the eyes of the people it serves.
23. Sandra Liebenberg, The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights, 2008 Acta Juridica 
149, 167–68.
24. See S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 1(d).
25. Doctors for Life Int’ l v. Speaker of the Nat’ l Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at para. 115.
524
“The AdverT WAs PuT uP YesTerdAY” NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 | 2015/16
 Responses to the TCB in the 2008 and 2012 public submissions to Parliament 
reflect the ways in which the failure to listen to experiences of customary law during 
the bill’s drafting significantly compromised the bill’s content, making it out of touch 
with the people it was intended to serve.
iii. bEfOrE thE tCb: sOUth afriCan LaW rEfOrM COMMissiOn prOCEss
 Between 1999 and 2003, the SALRC undertook Project 90 to identify the reforms 
necessary to support and enhance customary courts and to ensure that they functioned 
in line with the Constitution.26 In 2003, following discussions, submissions, and 
workshops around the country, the SALRC submitted a report and a draft bill to the 
Minister of Justice with recommendations on governance and administration under 
customary law and the relationship between customary and civil courts.27
 This examination focuses on the SALRC’s consultation process, in particular the 
forums used to solicit public participation, the efforts to hear different perspectives, 
and the manner in which these different voices influenced both the SALRC’s public 
participation procedure and its ultimate recommendations. 
 The SALRC’s Project Committee brought together experts on customary law 
from different disciplinary backgrounds. The Project Committee worked with a 
variety of institutions and organizations to host consultation workshops with 
stakeholders, including traditional leaders, academics, other experts on customary 
law, and, significantly, different groups governed by customary law.28 Reflecting on 
these workshops, the SALRC noted:
[A]lthough the purpose was essentially information-collection on the part of 
the Commission, the workshops would also afford communities (through 
their representatives) the opportunity to address the issue of customary law . . . . 
[T]he workshops were intended to enable people at grassroots level to feel 
that they “own” the process from its early stages.29
By emphasizing the significance of people feeling that they “own” legislation, the 
SALRC underlined the value of recognizing different perspectives and the space this 
sharing of knowledge creates to translate realities expressed through practice into 
legislation that is meaningful to people’s lives.
 On September 9, 1999, the Centre for Indigenous Law at the University of South 
Africa, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA), 
and the SALRC organized an academic workshop, “Customary Courts,” with 
experts from around the country.30 This was preceded by workshops held in June and 
26. See SA Law Reform Commission Project 90 Customary Law: Report on Traditional Courts and the 
Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders, at 1–3 (Jan. 2003).
27. See id.
28. Id. at 1–2. 
29. SA Law Reform Commission Project 90: Report on the Customary Law of Succession, at 7 (Apr. 2004).
30. SA Law Reform Commission Project 90 Customary Law: Report on Traditional Courts and the 
Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders, at 1 (Jan. 2003).
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July of 1999 in the Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, North 
West, and Limpopo.31 The SALRC reported:
These workshops were well attended with most stakeholders represented. In 
particular, traditional leaders of all ranks (chiefs, headmen and sub-headmen), 
magistrates, prosecutors, representatives of the regional offices of the 
Department of Justice, academics and ordinary people under the leadership of 
traditional leaders attended the workshops. In some provinces, representatives 
of provincial houses of traditional leaders, women’s groups and local council 
members also attended.32
In addition to the provincial workshops, the Project Committee held meetings 
between November 2002 and October 2003 and conducted household surveys “in 
about twelve sections in the townships” to diversify inputs on customary practices in 
these townships.33 The SALRC’s recognition of diversity in expressions of customary 
law and its efforts to be sensitive to different methodologies suggest a move away 
from essentializing custom and towards engaging with its true complexity.
 The SALRC briefed the Joint Monitoring Committee on Improvement of Quality 
of Life and Status of Women on the progress in consultation four times between 2001 
and 2003.34 In the initial stages of the consultation process, the Centre for Applied 
Legal Studies (CALS) at the University of the Witwatersrand and the SALRC hosted 
an “expert meeting” to discuss the SALRC’s recommendations and to ensure that the 
necessary measures were taken to make the reform of customary law inclusive.35 One 
of the primary critiques of the SALRC’s workshops came from women’s organizations, 
which argued that the first discussion document failed to address the problems that 
women in rural areas face in customary courts.36 In response to these criticisms, the 
Commission for Gender Equality, CALS, and the National Land Committee jointly 
held a series of consultations with women’s groups to understand their views on 
traditional courts.37 Workshops with women took place in September 1999, in 
KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, the Eastern Cape, and North West, often with local non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in attendance.38 “The workshops . . . concentrated 
on rural women and field workers active in the rural development context who [could] 
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1–2.
33. SA Law Reform Commission Project 90: Report on the Customary Law of Succession, at 8 (Apr. 
2004).
34. Id. at 7. These briefings occurred on August 29, 2001; October 18, 2002; April 4, 2003; and November 
18, 2003.
35. Id.
36. See SA Law Reform Commission Project 90 Customary Law: Report on Traditional Courts and the 
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provide a perspective different [from those] advanced by traditional leaders.”39 These 
meetings were the basis for a joint submission by the three organizations.40 The 
SALRC’s 2003 final report refers to women’s concerns raised in the joint submission 
and how it attempted to address them.41
 Public inputs on the drafting of the TCB revealed that in contrast to the SALRC’s 
deliberations, traditional leaders were consulted by the department responsible for 
drafting the bill to the exclusion of other affected groups.42 No attempts to consult 
rural women as a specific interest group were reported.43 This illustrates how the 
TCB drafting consultation process failed both to consider reservations raised during 
the SALRC’s consultation and to learn from the responses to these critiques. This 
omission also raises questions about the meaningfulness of the consultation process, 
given that a group that makes up the majority in South Africa’s rural areas44 was not 
engaged in a way that promoted access and free participation.
 Professors Thandabantu Nhlapo45 and Tom Bennett46 from the University of 
Cape Town raised concerns about the TCB process, linked specifically to the 
SALRC’s prior process, in their 2008 submission to the Portfolio Committee on 
Justice and Constitutional Development, the National Assembly committee 
responsible for the TCB. Nhlapo and Bennett argued:
As people who worked directly on producing the original draft bill on 
Traditional Courts that was attached to the Report of the Law Commission, 
we are aware that the present Bill bears little resemblance to that original 
draft. The problem with this is that no parliamentary hearing process could 
match the Law Commission consultation process that was undertaken in 
1999 for depth of debate or width of geographical coverage. . . .




42. See Law, Race and Gender Research Unit, Submission to the National Council of Provinces 5–6 (2012) 
[hereinafter LRG Submission 2012]; S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Submission to the National Council 
of Provinces 6 (2012) [hereinafter SAHRC Submission]; Women’s Legal Ctr., Submission to the 
National Council of Provinces 6 (2012) [hereinafter WLC Submission 2012].
43. See Thipe, supra note 7, at 4–6.
44. See LRG Submission 2012, supra note 42, at 5.
45. Professor Nhlapo was the leader of the customary law project and the Chairperson of the Project 
Committee during the development of the original draft bill. He also led the national consultation 
process, both with traditional leaders and later with women’s groups. Thandabantu Nhlapo & Tom 
Bennett, Submission to Parliament in Respect of the Traditional Courts Bill, § 1.3 (2008).
46. Professor Bennett was “a member of the Project Committee and author of the Discussion Paper and the 
final Report.” Id.
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 We submit that Parliament should see its way clear to extending the 
deadline for submissions, and to seek a way to solicit a wide range of views on 
the Bill, especially those of the rural people whose lives are lived under 
customary law.47
Nhlapo and Bennett “dr[e]w attention to the TCB’s lack of sensitivity to context and 
diversity and, like many other submissions, link[ed] the TCB’s crude representations 
of customary law to the poor consultation process” surrounding its development.48
 One of the significant differences between the SALRC’s recommendations and 
the TCB was that the SALRC’s recommendations allowed for “opting out” of 
traditional courts in favor of magistrates’ courts, whereas the TCB forced people 
within prescribed “tribal” boundaries to use traditional courts exclusively.49 The 
SALRC noted that because of the “controversy surrounding the issue of the 
independence and impartiality of customary courts” it was “safer to leave the door 
open for objecting to the jurisdiction of the customary court and opting out in favour 
of a magistrate’s court or other court particularly in criminal proceedings.”50 One of 
the primary criticisms of the TCB was that it denied the right to opt out of traditional 
courts, which illustrated its signif icant departure from the SALRC’s 
recommendations.51 The TCB ignored what public submissions described as a 
common practice of using different courts for different types of protection in different 
situations.52 Many women’s organizations objected to the provision against opting 
out, arguing that it was common practice for women to use magistrates’ courts in 
matters such as child maintenance and domestic violence, which state legislation 
covers comprehensively.53
 While the SALRC’s draft bill may not have been perfect, its recommendations 
were significantly more nuanced and responsive to difference and diversity than the 
TCB. These outcomes are reflective of the SALRC’s more inclusive consultation, 
which was broader in representation and more rigorous in factoring feedback from 
affected people into the development of the draft bill. This process engaged with 
positionality, recognizing the role that identity; localized history; and social, 
geographic, and political locations play in inf luencing personal interests and 
experiences of customary law.
47. Id. §§ 2.2.1, 3.
48. Thipe, supra note 7, at 7.
49. LRG Submission 2012, supra note 42, at 8.
50. SA Law Reform Commission Project 90 Customary Law: Report on Traditional Courts and the 
Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders, at 32 (Jan. 2003).
51. Thipe, supra note 7, at 14–18.
52. See LRG Submission 2012, supra note 42, at 9.
53. Thipe, supra note 7, at 18.
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iV. dEVELOpMEnt Of thE tCb in parLiaMEnt
 An explanatory summary of the TCB was published in the Government Gazette 
on March 27, 2008, after which it was introduced in the National Assembly.54 The 
Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development called for written 
submissions on April 21, with a deadline of May 6.55 There were three public holidays 
and two weekends in this sixteen-day period.56 The Portfolio Committee received 
fewer than twenty submissions—most of them were opposed to the TCB, and several 
people called for an extension of the comment period.57
 Many submissions communicated that only traditional leaders were actively 
engaged during the bill’s development. This critique was at the heart of much of the 
opposition to the bill. The TCB failed both substantively in the ways that it gave effect 
to the bolstering of traditional leaders’ power, and increased the vulnerability of people 
living within its jurisdiction, and procedurally in terms of the right to democratic 
participation.58 This position was supported by the Joint Monitoring Committee on 
the Improvement of Quality of Life and Status of Women in Parliament, which noted 
that “[t]he Bill has been drafted in consultation with traditional leaders but opinions 
and feelings of rural communities ha[ve] not been captured anywhere.”59
 At the TCB hearings on May 13, 14, and 20, 2008, only organizations 
representing traditional leaders supported the bill in its entirety.60 The Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the South African Council of Churches, 
the Commission for Gender Equality, and other civil society organizations—
including those representing rural women and various rural communities—opposed 
the TCB.61 The Portfolio Committee accepted in May that it would miss the June 
2008 deadline for repeal of the BAA’s tribal court provisions,62 and resolved on June 
54. Publication of Explanatory Summary of the Traditional Courts Bill, 2008, GN 392 of GG 30902 (27 
Mar. 2008).
55. Thipe, supra note 7, at 1.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Sindiso Mnisi, Submission to the National Assembly on the Traditional Courts Bill [B15-2008], at 
1–3 (2008) (on file with authors).
59. Joint Monitoring Comm. on the Improvement of Quality of Life and Status of Women, Submission to 
the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development on the Traditional Courts Bill 
[B15-2008], at 3 (2008).
60. See generally Traditional Courts Bill B15-2008: Department of Justice Briefing and Public Hearings, 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2008) (on file with authors) (detailing minutes from the May 
13, 2008 hearing and noting the subsequent meetings on May 14 and May 20, 2008).
61. Aninka Claassens, Ctr. for Law & Soc’y, Summary and Analysis of the Traditional Court 
Bill B 15–2008 (2009), http://www.lrg.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/docs/TCB/2012/tcb_summary_analysis.pdf.
62. See generally Publication of Draft Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain 
Laws Amendment Bill, 2008, GN 653 of GG 31088 (10 May 2012). The Repeal of the Black 
Administration Act and Amendment of Certain Laws Act 28 of 2005 § 1(3) previously stated that 
sections 12 and 20 of the BAA would be repealed either on June 30, 2008 or when a new national law 
regulating customary courts was implemented—whichever was first in time.
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17, 2008 to keep the BAA in force until the end of 2009.63 The provisions were 
extended further at the end of 200964 and again in 201065 until Parliament voted in 
2012 to keep them indefinitely.66
 The TCB was withdrawn from the National Assembly in June 2011. On 
December 13, 2011, as the holiday season began, the DOJCD unexpectedly 
announced in a Government Gazette notice that the TCB would be reintroduced in 
the NCOP in January and set a deadline of February 15, 2012 for comments.67
 The DOJCD briefed the NCOP’s Select Committee on Security and 
Constitutional Development (“Select Committee” or “Committee”) on the bill on 
March 7, 2012 and went on to brief individual provincial legislatures ahead of public 
hearings, which were held in all nine provinces in the month leading up to May 18, 
2012.68
 Several written submissions from people based in former bantustans,69 where the 
TCB would have had effect, communicated that the only information about the bill 
came from civil society groups.70 The submissions also detailed the significant 
personal expense that many undertook to attend hearings in centers far from where 
they lived. Many said traditional leaders, but not other residents, were transported to 
the hearings at the state’s expense.71
 The North West, Gauteng, Eastern Cape, and Western Cape delegations rejected 
the bill in the negotiating mandates submitted to the Select Committee after their 
provincial hearings.72 KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, the Free State, and the Northern 
63. See Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain Laws Amendment Act, 2008, 
GN 709 of GG 31199 (27 June 2008) (amending section 1(3) by replacing the repeal date of June 30, 
2008 with December 30, 2009); Black Administration Act: Adoption; Reform of Customary Law of Succession 
Bill: Briefing, Child Justice Bill: Deliberations, Parliamentary Monitoring Group (June 17, 2008), 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/9276/.
64. Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain Laws Act 20 of 2009.
65. Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain Laws Act 20 of 2010.
66. According to the Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain Laws Act 20 of 
2012, only the implementation of a national law to regulate customary courts (such as the TCB) can 
trigger the repeal of the relevant provisions in the BAA.
67. See Publication of Explanatory Summary of the Traditional Courts Bill, 2012 in Terms of Rule 186 of 
the Rules of the National Council of Provinces, GN 901 of GG 34850 (13 Dec. 2011).
68. Justice Briefs NCOP Select Committee on Traditional Courts Bill, Ctr. for L. & Soc’y (Mar. 7, 2012), 
http://www.lrg.uct.ac.za/news/?id=40&t=int. For a list of all hearings held in the provinces during 
April and May 2012, see Nolundi Luwaya, Report on the Provincial Traditional Courts Bill 
Hearings: Exploring Rural People’s Democratic Participation and Freedom of Expression 
39–40 (2013).
69. Bantustans, or Bantu or black homelands, were territories set aside for the black population under 
apartheid. See The Homelands, S. Afr. Hist. Online, http://www.sahistory.org.za/special-features/
homelands (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
70. Thipe, supra note 7, at 5–9.
71. See id. at 5.
72. Id. at 2.
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Cape submitted proposals for contradictory amendments.73 Mpumalanga asked for a 
three-month extension to prepare its mandate.74
 The Select Committee resolved at this point to hold another round of hearings 
rather than debate the provincial mandates on the bill. A May 31, 2012 letter to the 
chair of the NCOP by the Legal Resources Centre pointed out that this was a 
procedural anomaly and urged the Committee to consider the negotiating mandates 
submitted by the provinces as it was supposed to do.75 This did not happen. Instead, 
a new call for written submissions was made by the Committee76 and national public 
hearings were held from September 18 to 21, 2012 in Cape Town.77 At least twenty-
four oral submissions were made to the Committee during this period, many by 
people based in rural areas. Of this number, approximately twenty spoke in opposition 
to the TCB.78 Unusually, the DOJCD was also permitted to make a “submission” on 
the bill, rather than merely briefing the Committee at the onset of the hearings.79 
This DOJCD “submission” included responses to arguments raised in other 
submissions and proposals for a regulatory framework that departed substantially 
from the content of the bill under consideration in the hearings—the same bill that 
the DOJCD itself originally tabled in Parliament.80 It seems that the DOJCD’s 
“submission” was a dubious attempt to introduce a new government policy position 
via a public submissions process in the hope that its position would eventually trump 
the views of the public.
 When the Select Committee met on October 24, 2012 to table its report on the 
hearings, the DOJCD presented a document that summarized only two submissions 
—those of the South African Human Rights Commission and the Department of 
73. Id.
74. See Traditional Courts Bill [B1-2012]: Briefings by UCT and Deliberations on Process, Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group (May 30, 2012), http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20120530-traditional-courts-
bill-briefings-uct-and-deliberations-process [hereinafter PMG 2012 Briefings]. 
75. Letter from the Legal Res. Ctr. to Mninwa Johannes Mahlangu, Honourable Chair, Nat’l Council of 
Provinces (May 31, 2012), http://www.lrg.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/docs/TCB/2012/LRC_Letter_
NCOP_31May2012.pdf.
76. Select Committee Calls for More Submissions and Hearings on TCB, Ctr. for L. & Soc’y (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://www.cls.uct.ac.za/news/archives/?id=53&t=int. 
77. TCB Public Hearings Postponed by One Week, Ctr. for L. & Soc’y (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.lrg.uct.
ac.za/news/archives/?id=56&t=int. 
78. See Report of the Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Development on the Traditional Courts Bill 
Public Hearings Held in Parliament 18 to 21 September 2012, dated 28 November 2012, Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group, https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/286/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); see 
also Thipe, supra note 7, at 2. 
79. In contrast, the PMG noted that some parliamentary committees have been adamant that government 
departments not express opinions on bills after they have entered the parliamentary process. See Susan 
Williams, Parliamentary Monitoring Grp., Overview of Fourth Parliament 9 (2014) 
[hereinafter PMG Overview]. 
80. See Dep’t of Justice & Constitutional Dev., Submission of the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development to the Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Development on the Traditional 
Courts Bill (2012), http://db3sqepoi5n3s.cloudfront.net/files/docs/120912scsecuritydevelopment.pdf.
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Women, Children and People with Disabilities.81 One member of the Committee 
argued that any account of the public hearings that did not represent the opposition 
to the TCB would not accurately summarize the process.82 The Committee 
chairperson said that the majority of submissions had been excluded because they 
were “irrelevant.”83 This position disregarded important experiential and contextual 
contributions by members of the public who could not reasonably be expected to 
make reference to provisions in the bill as legal experts would.
 The DOJCD occupied a dual role as stakeholder with its own “submission” and 
as gatekeeper of submissions deemed “relevant” for the summary report. It is 
questionable whether the DOJCD should have occupied either of these roles after 
the responsibility for drafting the TCB had been transferred from the DOJCD to 
Parliament by the official tabling of the bill in the NCOP.84 After uproar by the 
Alliance for Rural Democracy,85 the Select Committee adopted a new report on 
November 27, 2012—rewritten to incorporate all of the submissions made at the 
national hearings.86
 There was no further communication from the Select Committee on the status 
of the bill for almost a year after the report was adopted, until the Committee 
announced there would be a meeting on October 15, 2013 for the dormant TCB. 
The Committee resolved again at that meeting not to hold debates on mandates 
submitted by the provinces, as the mandates needed further clarification.87 Instead, it 
decided on more public consultation in the provinces—purportedly to allow provinces 
more time to resolve “ambiguities” regarding the proposals in their negotiating 
mandates.88 Some civil society organizations speculated that members of the Select 
Committee were being swayed by political concerns that a majority of provinces 
81. Media Release, All. for Rural Democracy, Traditional Courts Bill: Committee Chairperson 
Compromises Parliament’s Integrity. Civil Society Calls for His Status to be Reviewed (Oct. 24, 2012), 
http://www.lrg.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/docs/TCB/2012/Media_Release_24102012.pdf.
82. Thipe, supra note 7, at 2; see also Traditional Courts Bill: Department Responses to Public Hearings, 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (Oct. 24, 2012), https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/15098/ 
[hereinafter Department Responses to Public Hearings].
83. Department Responses to Public Hearings, supra note 82.
84. For additional discussion of concerns about Parliament’s reliance on government departments for 
drafting and advice, see PMG Overview, supra note 79, at 23.
85. See Media Release, All. for Rural Democracy, supra note 81. 
86. See Repeal of Black Administration Amd Bill; Prevention & Combatting of Trafficking in Persons Bill: SAPS, 
Depts of Justice/Social Development Input; Protection of Personal Information Bill; Traditional Courts Bill 
Committee Report on Public Hearings, Parliamentary Monitoring Group (Nov. 27, 2012), https://
pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/15316/ [hereinafter Committee Report on Public Hearings].
87. See Traditional Courts Bill: Referral to the Provinces for Further Deliberations; Criminal Law (Forensic 
Procedures) Amendment Bill: Deliberations, Parliamentary Monitoring Group (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20131015-traditional-courts-bill-referral-provinces-for-further-
deliberations-criminal-law-forensic-procedures-amendment [hereinafter TCB Referral to the Provinces].
88. See id.
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might reject the bill.89 It emerged later that the Select Committee had considered 
advice received from a parliamentary legal office, which assessed inter alia whether 
the bill should have been withdrawn as some committee members had suggested, or 
whether there should have been further consultation as the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development had suggested.90
 By October 2013, the Minister’s suggestions had prevailed and further rounds of 
hearings were later held by the Free State and North West provincial legislatures.91 
The Free State retained its negotiating mandate in favor of the bill, while North 
West converted its negotiating mandate from rejection to support for the TCB.92
 By February 2014, when the Select Committee was scheduled to finally consider 
provincial negotiating mandates, four provinces opposed the bill, four provinces 
supported the bill with amendments, and one province abstained from voting.93 It 
became clear at a meeting on February 12 that no province would accept the bill 
without extensive changes and that suggested amendments were contradictory.94 One 
week later, the responses of a parliamentary law advisor suggested that wide-ranging 
amendments would be necessary to correct defects in the bill.95
 With only a short period before the rising of Parliament ahead of national 
elections, and an apparent impasse on the way forward, the TCB was removed from 
the parliamentary schedule on the technical argument that it had not been properly 
89. See Media Release, Ctr. for Law and Soc’y, Victory for Rural People as Most Provinces Oppose TCB, 
yet Parliament Wants More “Consultation” (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.customcontested.co.za/victory-
rural-people-provinces-oppose-tcb-yet-parliament-wants-consultation/; see also Media Release, All. for 
Rural Democracy, NCOP Again Ignores Rural Voices on Traditional Courts Bill: A Case of “We’ll 
Consult Until We Change Your Minds”? (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.customcontested.co.za/ncop-
ignores-rural-voices-traditional-courts-bill-case-well-consult-change-minds/.
90. See Media Release, All. for Rural Democracy and the Tshintsha Amakhaya Platform, NCOP Succumbs 
to Pressure from the Executive Not to Withdraw the TCB (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.customcontested.
co.za/ncop-succumbs-pressure-executive-withdraw-tcb/.
91. See id.; Media Release, All. for Rural Democracy, Third Round of Hearings on the TCB Fails to 
Change Minds (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.customcontested.co.za/third-round-hearings-tcb-fails-
change-minds/ [hereinafter Third Round of Hearings on the TCB Fails to Change Minds]. 
92. Note that both provinces supported the bill, provided that certain amendments would be taken into 
consideration. For details of negotiating mandates, see Select Comm. Sec’y, The Traditional 
Courts Bill: Summary of the Process to Date 5 February 2014 (Comm. Print 2014), http://
db3sqepoi5n3s.cloudfront.net/files/140204summary.pdf.
93. Id.
94. See Traditional Courts Bill [B1–2012]: Consideration of Negotiating Mandates, Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20140212-traditional-courts-bill-
b1-2012-consideration-negotiating-mandates; see also Aninka Claassens, NCOP in Disarray About TCB, 
Custom Contested (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.customcontested.co.za/ncop-disarray-tcb/.
95. See Traditional Courts Bill: Legal Response to Provinces’ Proposals (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.pmg.org.za/
report/20140219-traditional-courts-bill-legal-response-provinces-proposals; see also Mbongiseni 
Buthelezi, TCB on Life Support, Custom Contested (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.customcontested.
co.za/tcb-life-support/. 
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revived since the previous year, as required by procedure.96 The Alliance for Rural 
Democracy contended that this was to prevent the humiliation of rejection after so 
many years in the legislature.97 In any event, the bill was set to lapse by the close of 
the parliamentary term in March 2014.
 The existence of anomalies in the lawmaking process, coupled with particularly 
fierce opposition to the TCB by members of the public and civil society, make the 
TCB’s passage through Parliament an interesting case study for the application and 
effectiveness of the Constitution’s parliamentary public participation requirements. 
The following sections take a closer look at the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence 
on public participation in the legislative process in light of the TCB’s development 
thus far.
V. LEgaL rEQUirEMEnts fOr COnsULtatiOn
 A. Constitutional Framework for Public Participation
 Parliament’s rules provide that the public may participate in parliamentary 
processes by attending meetings, submitting written comments or petitions, or giving 
oral testimony before Parliament.98 These rules are rooted in constitutional provisions 
for public participation in the lawmaking process. For the NCOP, the specific powers 
and requirements that allow the public to participate are located within sections 69, 
70(1)(b), and 72 of the Constitution. Section 72(1)(a) explicitly imposes a duty on the 
NCOP with respect to public participation: “The National Council of Provinces 
must . . . facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the 
Council and its committees. . . .”99
 The Constitution contains corresponding provisions for the National Assembly,100 
and for the various provincial legislatures.101 These provisions allow the legislative 
bodies to ask for evidence or information, to accept input from stakeholders, and to 
make procedural rules consistent with principles of transparent and participatory 
96. See Media Release, All. for Rural Democracy, Traditional Courts Bill is Dead! (Feb. 21, 2014), http://
www.customcontested.co.za/traditional-courts-bill-dead/.
97. Id. 
98. Rule 6 of the Joint Rules of Parliament, Rule 5 of the Rules of the National Council of Provinces, and 
to a lesser extent, Rules 203F and 203M of the Rules of the National Assembly provide for this public 
participation. See also Doctors for Life Int’ l v. Speaker of the Nat’ l Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at para. 
144 (noting that Rule 6 of the Joint Rules of Parliament “deals specifically with public participation and 
provides that members of the public may participate in the joint business of the Houses by attending the 
sittings of the Houses and their committees; by commenting in writing on bills or other matters before 
joint committees or giving evidence or making representations or recommendations on a bill before the 
House.”).
99. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 72(1)(a).
100. Id. §§ 56, 57(1)(b), 59.
101. Id. §§ 115, 116(1)(b), 118; see also Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 136.
534
“The AdverT WAs PuT uP YesTerdAY” NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 | 2015/16
democracy to fulfill their broad mandate to facilitate public involvement and make 
lawmaking processes open to the public.102
 There is a significant body of literature that more broadly examines the 
Constitutional Court’s framing of meaningful engagement and the role of 
consultation in transformative democracy and the provision of services by the state.103 
This piece focuses on the role of public participation in the legislative process to allow 
for a richer and more relevant analysis and evaluation of the TCB’s journey so far.
 B. Interpreting the Constitutional Provisions: Doctors for Life Sets the Standard
 In Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly, the 
Constitutional Court discussed at length the legislature’s duty to facilitate public 
involvement in its lawmaking processes, including those of parliamentary 
committees.104 This case arose because the NCOP and provincial legislatures had, 
for the most part, failed to call for written submissions from the public and to hold 
public hearings before passing certain bills.105 Thus, the Court had to determine 
whether the NCOP and provincial legislatures had failed to honor their constitutional 
obligation to facilitate public participation.
 The Court said that three considerations were necessary for a contextual 
understanding of the national and provincial legislatures’ constitutional obligation: 
first, the NCOP’s role in the lawmaking process; second, the right to political 
participation; and third, the nature of South Africa’s constitutional democracy.106 The 
first of these considerations refers to the role played by the NCOP in protecting 
provincial interests in the national sphere and in involving provincial legislatures in 
national lawmaking debates, since provincial legislatures provide the NCOP delegates 
with their voting mandates.107 The Court’s second consideration was that public 
involvement in lawmaking forms part of the international right to political 
participation, consisting of “at least two elements: a general right to take part in the 
102. S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 56, 57(1)(b), 59, 69, 70(1)(b), 72, 115, 116(1)(b), 118.
103. See generally Sandra Liebenberg, Engaging the Paradoxes of the Universal and Particular in Human Rights 
Adjudication: The Possibilities and Pitfalls of ‘Meaningful Engagement ’, 12 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 1 (2012); 
Gustav Muller, Conceptualising “Meaning ful Engagement” as a Deliberative Democratic Partnership, 22 
Stellenbosch L. Rev. 742 (2012).
104. 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 1.
105. Id. at paras. 2, 4.
106. Id. at para. 78. The Constitutional Court defined “public involvement” as “the active participation of 
the public in the decision-making processes” and noted that it was used interchangeably with the term 
“public participation.” Id. at para. 118.
107. See S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 42(4); see also Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at paras. 79, 81, 86–88, 151, 
179; Matatiele Municipality v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC) at paras. 39, 41, 
47. In Matatiele, the Court noted that provincial legislatures have a duty to facilitate public participation 
when they are involved in national legislative processes at the NCOP via their delegations. Matatiele, 
2007 (1) BCLR 47 at para. 47.
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conduct of public affairs; and a more specific right to vote and/or to be elected.”108 
Thus, the South African Constitution incorporates political rights related to an 
electoral process at section 19,109 but then also introduces state obligations to facilitate 
ongoing public participation in lawmaking and other decisionmaking processes.110
 The Court’s third consideration was the participatory nature of South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy. It said that because the founding values of accountability, 
responsiveness, and openness are included in the Constitution, our democracy is not 
only about representation of the people by members of Parliament but also about 
participation by the people themselves in Parliament.111
 This feature of our democracy finds its origins in the concept of people’s power—a 
concept used during the struggle against apartheid to encapsulate the need to provide 
South Africa’s majority with the voice that they were denied in national lawmaking 
and political processes—which saw the rise of community-based groups in opposition 
to the apartheid system.112 Many of these same groups were denied a democratic 
voice during the TCB legislative process.113
 One criticism of the 2012 provincial and national hearings was that the poor 
advertisement of and limited accessibility to the hearings were deliberate attempts to 
exclude those who would be affected by the bill and to silence opposition. Simangele 
Zungu from KwaZulu-Natal wrote:
The advert about the Public Hearings in Parliament was on the newspapers a 
week ago and within a week as rural communities we are expected to have 
organized ourselves and developed submissions and select members of our 
communities to represent us. . . . All we could see through all of this is that 
the government is just conducting these hearings for the sake of conducting it 
108. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 90; see also Poverty Alleviation Network v. President of the 
Republic of S. Afr. 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC) at para. 34; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his 
country . . . .”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (stating that every citizen shall have the right to take part in public affairs, to vote and to 
be elected, and to have access to public service).
109. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 19 (discussing political rights). The Constitution further states that “[u]niversal 
adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic 
government” are some of the founding values of South Africa. Id. § 1(d). 
110. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 108.
111. Id. at paras. 111, 122. This contextual consideration was confirmed and applied in Matatiele. 2007 (1) 
BCLR 47 at paras. 39–40, 56–65; see also Poverty Alleviation Network, 2010 (6) BCLR 520 at para. 33 
(discussing the importance of public involvement for a legitimate democratic state); Merafong 
Demarcation Forum v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC) at para. 26 (discussing the 
importance of public participation as well as representative democracy).
112. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 112.
113. In Doctors for Life, the Court noted the special need for consultation with respect to issues that affect 
groups that were previously discriminated against, so as to prevent their marginalization. See id. at para. 
174. Persons living in the former homelands of South Africa, for whom the TCB would be most 
applicable would certainly also fall within this category. See LRG Submission 2012, supra note 42.
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and not expecting to listen to our voice as rural communities who will be 
impacted negatively by this Bill.114
The author sees the exclusion from public participation as politically motivated and 
locates it within a broader trend of legislation on customary law that is focused on 
the interests of traditional leaders rather than the majority of people who live under 
traditional leadership.115 The “Concerned Residents of Herschel,” representing 
residents from six “Tribal Authority” areas in the Eastern Cape, explained:
There were no notices made to the wider community of Herschel about the 
hearings. . . . [T]he Herschel hearing was held in Queenstown, more than 
200 kilometers from the Herschel District. This is seen as a deliberate 
attempt by government to exclude the people of Herschel of their 
constitutional right to participate in the TCB process. If there were any 
discussion[s] that took place about the TCB, Traditional Leaders kept [it] to 
themselves. The Concerned Residents of Herschel heard about the hearing 
from an unofficial source . . . .116
The “Concerned Residents of Herschel” illustrate that even when the TCB was 
reintroduced in 2012, after widespread protest about the poor consultation in 2008, 
Parliament continued to shape consultation in a way that excluded people who would 
be affected by the bill.
 C. Content of Parliament’s Duty
 With the three considerations enumerated above in mind, the Constitutional 
Court in Doctors for Life examined the content of Parliament’s duty to facilitate public 
involvement, stating that Parliament must “[take] steps to ensure that the public 
participate in the legislative process.”117 However, the Constitution does not specify 
what steps Parliament should take, instead giving it the discretion to develop its own 
mechanisms.118 The Constitutional Court’s duty is then to assess whether the degree 
114. Simangele Zungu, KwaZulu-Natal, Submission on the Traditional Courts Bill of 2012 (2012) (on file 
with authors); see also Thipe, supra note 7, at 6.
115. See Back to the Dark Day, Mail & Guardian, http://mg.co.za/article/2008-05-16-back-to-the-dark-
day (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); Aninka Claassens, What’s Wrong with the Traditional Courts Bill, Mail & 
Guardian (June 2, 2008), http://mg.co.za/article/2008-06-02-whats-wrong-with-the-traditional-
courts-bill; Sindiso Mnisi, Terror in the Name of Tradition, Mail & Guardian (Feb. 26, 2010), http://
mg.co.za/article/2010-02-25-terror-in-the-name-of-tradition.
116. Concerned Residents of Herschel, Submission on the Traditional Courts Bill (TCB) 1–2 (2012), http://
www.lrg.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/docs/TCB/2012/herschel_apr2012_provsubmission.pdf.
117. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 120; see also Poverty Alleviation Network v. President of the 
Republic of S. Afr. 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC) at para. 35.
118. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at paras. 123, 145; see also S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 57(1), 70(1), 116(1); 
Moutse Demarcation Forum v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2011 (11) BCLR 1158 (CC) at para. 49; 
Poverty Alleviation Network, 2010 (6) BCLR 520 at para. 35; Merafong Demarcation Forum v. President of 
the Republic of S. Afr. 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC) at para. 27; Matatiele Municipality v. President of the Republic 
of S. Afr. 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC) at para. 67.
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of participation decided upon by the legislative body in each case has been sufficient 
to comply with the Constitution.119
 The Constitutional Court held that the standard to be used in making this 
determination is reasonableness, judged on the following factors: the nature, 
importance, and potential impact of the legislation; temporal and budgetary 
constraints on Parliament; Parliament’s own assessment of appropriate public 
involvement in the particular context; and whether Parliament has adopted any rules 
or policies to facilitate public participation.120 In this way, the pragmatic difficulty 
associated with Parliament’s mandate is acknowledged and respect is given to its 
original lawmaking power.121
 Justice Ngcobo discussed judicial deference to Parliament’s legislative powers in 
the context of public participation in the Doctors for Life majority judgment:
[T]he Court must balance, on the one hand, the need to respect parliamentary 
institutional autonomy, and on the other, the right of the public to participate 
in public affairs. In my view, this balance is best struck by this Court 
considering whether what Parliament does in each case is reasonable.122
The Court went on to say that the judiciary must establish whether Parliament 
fulfilled its duty based on whether “the legislature has taken steps to afford the public 
a reasonable opportunity to participate effectively in the law-making process.”123 
This formulation of the reasonableness inquiry has two components: first, whether 
meaningful opportunities had been provided, and second, whether measures were put 
in place so that people could actually use the opportunities that Parliament created.124
 Interestingly, the Court considered whether the NCOP could forego calling 
separate public hearings by piggybacking onto public hearings held by the provincial 
119. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at paras. 124–25, 199–200.
120. Id. at paras. 128, 146; see also Poverty Alleviation Network, 2010 (6) BCLR 520 at para. 36; Merafong 
Demarcation Forum, 2008 (5) SA 171 at para. 27; Matatiele, 2007 (1) BCLR 47 at paras. 52, 67–68. As 
discussed earlier, Parliament has indeed adopted general rules and introduced initiatives for the 
involvement of the public in its processes. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Moreover, the 
Constitutional Court warns in Matatiele that this is not exhaustive of the duty to facilitate public 
involvement. See 2007 (1) BCLR 47 at para. 52.
121. See Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at paras. 139–40. Justice Ngcobo for the majority confirms an 
observation made in King v. Attorneys’ Fid. Fund Bd. of Control 2006 (1) SA 474 (SCA) at para. 22 that 
the public participation provision in the Constitution merely “sets a base standard” and that Parliament 
has the prerogative to decide for itself how best to facilitate public involvement. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) 
SA 416 at para. 139.
122. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 146; see also Poverty Alleviation Network, 2010 (6) BCLR 520 at 
para. 35 (noting that it is crucial to strike a balance between judicial deference and the public’s right to 
participate).
123. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 129. The Court adds that “[i]nterested parties are entitled to a 
reasonable opportunity to participate in a manner which may inf luence legislative decisions.” Id. at para. 
171. This suggests that parliamentarians should enter the legislative process with clear minds, capable of 
persuasion based on input from the public.
124. Id. at para. 129; see also Moutse Demarcation Forum v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2011 (11) BCLR 
1158 (CC) at para. 49; Matatiele, 2007 (1) BCLR 47 at para. 54.
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legislatures.125 It decided that this was possible if the NCOP actually took account of 
provincial interests emerging from local hearings.126 In the case of the TCB, the 
NCOP could not claim to be piggybacking onto provincial hearings because it failed 
to consider the provincial negotiating mandates when they were submitted in May 
2012.127 This arguably forced the NCOP to hold its own national public hearings in 
September before proceeding with debates on the bill.
 In Doctors for Life, the two statutes under consideration were declared 
unconstitutional and Parliament was given the opportunity to re-enact them with 
proper public participation.128
 D. Building on Doctors for Life
 A trio of cases (Matatiele, Merafong, and Moutse) concerning the duty of provincial 
legislatures to facilitate public involvement followed the Doctors for Life case. All 
three cases dealt inter alia with the steps taken by provincial legislatures to foster 
public participation in the process of legislative amendments to the Constitution and 
other laws that were to alter the boundaries of some provinces.
  1. Matatiele Confirms the Reasonableness Standard
 In Matatiele Municipality v. President of the Republic of South Africa, a majority of 
the Constitutional Court confirmed and applied the principles set out in Doctors for 
Life to the conduct of the KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape provincial legislatures.129 
In addition, the Court noted that where legislation is likely to have more of an effect 
on a “discrete” group of people, that group could more reasonably expect to be heard 
by legislative bodies.130
 The Eastern Cape legislature had conducted public hearings in several areas and 
had accepted written submissions131 while the KwaZulu-Natal legislature invited no 
submissions in any form from the public despite having regarded public hearings as 
125. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at paras. 159–64.
126. Id. In Doctors for Life, this was interpreted to require that all provincial legislatures actually hold public 
hearings and that the NCOP has access to records of those hearings. Note, though, that the Court 
stated that each legislative body needs to find its mandate afresh and facilitate its own public 
participation as a general principle. Id. at para. 151.
127. PMG 2012 Briefings, supra note 74.
128. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at paras. 198–214. A similar declaration and remedy was deemed 
appropriate in Matatiele, 2007 (1) BCLR 47 at paras. 88–99, 109, 114.
129. 2006 (5) SA 47 (CC). Interestingly, judgment for Matatiele was delivered on the day following the 
Doctors for Life judgment—although Justice Yacoob noted in Matatiele that the two judgments were 
“considered by the Court side by side.” Id. at para. 124.
130. Id. at para. 68. James Fowkes, a senior researcher at the Institute for International and Comparative 
Law in Africa, has pointed out in correspondence with the authors that with respect to the TCB, this 
principle could support an argument that safe public participation spaces should have been provided for 
women, particularly from rural areas, as a “discrete” group.
131. Matatiele, 2007 (1) BCLR 47 at para. 71.
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necessary due to the potential impact of the legislation.132 Accordingly, it was held 
that only the Eastern Cape had acted reasonably in trying to fulfill its duty to 
facilitate public involvement.133
 Parliament’s renewed attempt to alter the boundary between these two provinces 
was challenged again in Poverty Alleviation Network v. President of the Republic of 
South Africa.134 Applicants complained inter alia that they had not been given a 
“meaningful opportunity to be heard” separately and exclusively as a “discrete” group 
in oral submission form.135
 Unlike in Matatiele, the provincial legislature, as well as the National Assembly and 
the NCOP, did provide some opportunities for the public to submit views on the new 
boundaries.136 The KwaZulu-Natal Legislature held four public hearings and specifically 
invited the applicants to attend.137 In the National Assembly, full written submissions by 
the Poverty Alleviation Network applicants and others were considered.138
 The Court held that while discrete groups could reasonably expect to be heard 
during lawmaking processes, as per Matatiele, this did not mean that they had to be 
the only groups consulted “to the exclusion of all others.”139 This meant that even if, 
for example, traditional leaders were considered to be a “discrete” group likely to be 
more affected by the TCB, they could by no means be consulted to the exclusion of 
others. That is precisely what occurred during the drafting stages of the TCB.
  2. Merafong Considers Meaningful Participation
 Merafong Demarcation Forum v. President of the Republic of South Africa140 was 
decided in the Constitutional Court two years after Doctors for Life and Matatiele. 
This case extended the inquiry to ask whether, notwithstanding the opportunity to 
be heard, participation by the public had been meaningful.141 The Gauteng legislature 
had conducted a public hearing and accepted written submissions from several 
different stakeholders.142 However, after having absorbed these views into its 
negotiating mandate before the NCOP, Gauteng adopted a final mandate that was 
in direct opposition to both its own negotiating mandate and the views of the 
132. Id. at paras. 74–83.
133. Id. at para. 73.
134. 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC).
135. Id. at paras. 17, 50. The applicants argued that the Matatiele residents’ views were “watered down” by 
others’ presence at the public hearings. Id. at para. 50.
136. Id. at paras. 38, 41–42.
137. Id. at paras. 43–45.
138. Id. at paras. 57–58.
139. Id. at para. 53.
140. 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC).
141. Id. at paras. 43, 45.
142. Id. at paras. 31–33, 43.
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public.143 The Merafong Demarcation Forum and other applicants in the case argued 
that this suggested that Gauteng’s final vote was a “done deal” no matter what 
emerged from the public engagement process and that the legislature should have 
consulted the public prior to changing its vote.144
 The Court dismissed this argument, saying that the Gauteng legislature was 
clearly intent on considering and incorporating the views of the public and in fact did 
so.145 By its nature, a provincial legislature’s negotiating mandate could always change 
during negotiation with other provinces in the NCOP.146 What emerges as a final 
mandate is the product of public views, political party policies, discussion in the 
provincial legislature, and negotiation at the NCOP.147 The Court noted that “being 
involved does not mean that one’s views must necessarily prevail”148 but that this “is 
not the same as cynically stating that the legislature is not required to keep an open 
mind when engaging in a process of that kind.”149
 Thus, while interested persons have a right to a reasonable opportunity to be 
heard and to have their views taken into consideration by the legislature, they do not 
have a right to have their suggestions implemented. Furthermore, while it would 
have been politically sound for the Gauteng legislature to report back to the public 
once it was clear that its final mandate would depart from public opinion, there was 
no legal duty to do so—particularly in light of the fact that it was not legally bound 
by what had emerged from public consultation.150
 Similar issues arose later in Poverty Alleviation Network. One provincial hearing 
attracted about 3,000 members of the public, and opposition to the new boundary 
laws appeared universal.151 Despite this, KwaZulu-Natal voted in favor of the laws, 
and the applicants claimed that the public had the impression that the province was 
acting on orders from the national government.152
 This caused applicants in the case to argue that the relevant legislative bodies 
had never actually considered their input and that participation had been a façade for 
constitutional compliance.153 The Constitutional Court dismissed the argument and 
143. Id. at paras. 34–39.
144. Id. at paras. 43–47. Similarly, the applicants in Poverty Alleviation Network made the contention that 
“the impugned legislation was a product of a politically dictated, pre-determined decision.” 2010 (6) 
BCLR 520 (CC) at para. 18.
145. Merafong, 2008 (5) SA 171 at paras. 49, 52–53.
146. Id. at para. 49.
147. See id. at paras. 49–50.
148. Id. at para. 50.
149. Id. at para. 51.
150. See id. at paras. 54–60.
151. Poverty Alleviation Network v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC) at para. 48.
152. Id. at para. 49.
153. See id. at paras. 17–18, 59.
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confirmed the assertion in Merafong that openness to all views is required to make 
public participation meaningful, but that Parliament is not bound by those views.154
  3. Implications of Merafong for the Traditional Courts Bill Process
 Unlike in Doctors for Life and Matatiele, public participation opportunities in 
provincial legislatures and the NCOP included both written and oral submissions on 
the version of the TCB tabled in 2012.155 The issues, therefore, were whether the 
public could actually make use of those opportunities and whether, as in Merafong, 
those opportunities were meaningful to the legislative process.
 The public’s ability to participate in the opportunities provided during the TCB 
process was hampered by several factors, including inadequate notice and a lack of 
information.156 The remaining question about the meaningfulness of participation 
calls to mind the fate of the original negotiating mandates submitted by provinces to 
the Select Committee in May 2012. Members of the public and stakeholders 
endeavored to contribute views on the bill either verbally or in writing to provincial 
legislatures, despite significant obstacles. It is difficult to assess whether the 
negotiating mandates purportedly resulting from these views accurately ref lected 
public opinion on the bill throughout each province. Yet, once submitted, these 
mandates should have been debated in the Select Committee regardless of their 
f laws, as is required by Parliament’s own procedures. The fact that they were not 
debated casts doubt on how meaningful the provincial public participation actually 
was. At the time, the public was left wondering whether there was any point in 
submitting views to provincial legislatures when those views were not being conveyed 
to the national drafting forum.
 As in Merafong, one province changed its mandate during the TCB legislative 
process: while North West initially voted against the bill, it changed its mandate after 
an unusual second round of hearings in the province.157 Unlike in Merafong, however, 
the change in North West’s opinion was not the result of political discussion and 
negotiation in the Select Committee to produce a final mandate different from an 
earlier negotiating mandate. North West reversed the mandate with which it was to 
enter into negotiation in the first place. In the process, North West appeared to 
disregard the strong dissenting views presented during the previous round of provincial 
hearings in favor of supporting views from the second round of provincial hearings.158
 It is worth noting the Select Committee’s reluctance to debate the negotiating 
mandates when they were first submitted and the unorthodox invitation to repeat 
public hearing processes in the provinces. The logic behind the Committee’s decision 
154. Id. at paras. 62–63.
155. For a summary of the public participation facilitated by the NCOP, see Select Comm. Sec’y, supra 
note 92. For a comprehensive account of the TCB public participation processes facilitated by the 
provincial legislatures, see Luwaya, supra note 68.
156. See discussion infra Part V.D.5. for a more detailed consideration of these issues.
157. Select Comm. Sec’y, supra note 92, § 2(6).
158. See Third Round of Hearings on the TCB Fails to Change Minds, supra note 91.
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to invite additional provincial hearings was questioned in an October 15, 2013 
meeting by a representative of the Eastern Cape Legislature, as reported in minutes 
of the meeting:
[The representative] said it would be unfortunate if the Bill had to be taken 
back to the provinces again . . . . The Eastern Cape had held thorough 
consultations and public hearings, and the people were saying the Bill was not 
in the interests of the country . . . . [The representative’s view was] that it was 
a waste of time to refer the Bill back, as he did not see provinces coming to 
Parliament again with any other mandate.159
 Further provincial hearings were permitted nonetheless. In a series of media 
statements, the Alliance for Rural Democracy questioned whether these procedural 
manipulations by the Select Committee were politically motivated and underpinned 
by a rationale of “[w]e’ll consult until we change your minds.”160 Only two provinces, 
the Free State and North West, opted to have additional hearings, but the resulting 
mandate f lip by North West was sufficient to prevent a five-province majority voting 
outright against the bill.161
 In circumstances such as these, where lawmakers appear to be motivated in the 
first instance by political considerations162 and not by genuine expressions of public 
opinion, the meaningfulness of particular public participation opportunities, as well 
as public participation in the lawmaking process more broadly, is undermined.163 It is 
arguable that if lawmakers cannot take account only of public opinion when drafting 
laws (as per the Court’s decision in Merafong), then they cannot take account only of 
political considerations, either.
  4.  Moutse Links Timing to Meaning fulness and Leaves Report-Writing to 
Legislative Committees
 In Moutse Demarcation Forum v. President of South Africa, the applicants argued 
that despite having provided several opportunities for public comment, the 
Mpumalanga Provincial Legislature failed to meet its constitutional duty to facilitate 
public participation adequately while considering two laws that would change its 
provincial boundaries.164
159. TCB Referral to the Provinces, supra note 87.
160. See, e.g., Media Release, All. for Rural Democracy, supra note 81; see also Mbongiseni Buthelezi, The 
Disturbing Passage of the Traditional Courts Bill, The Star, Nov. 26, 2013; PMG Overview, supra note 
79, at 9.
161. See Select Comm. Sec’y, supra note 92.
162. See PMG Overview, supra note 79, at 18, 28. Some parliamentarians have openly admitted that their 
mandates are obtained from the political parties of which they are elected members, not from the people 
that they are meant to represent in Parliament. Id. at 28.
163. See id. at 26.
164. 2011 (11) BCLR 1158 (CC) at paras. 22, 51.
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 The Mpumalanga legislature held four public hearings, whereafter a committee in 
the legislature considered submissions and compiled a report.165 After initially denying 
the applicants’ request for a fifth hearing, and after protest action by the applicants, 
the committee arranged an additional hearing and incorporated comments from the 
hearing into a revised version of its report.166 According to the Court, this revised 
report formed the basis for Mpumalanga’s vote in favor of the laws in the NCOP.167
 The Court considered the applicants’ argument that the people of Moutse should 
reasonably have been consulted by the Mpumalanga legislature as a “discrete group” 
since they would be directly affected by the proposed laws.168 The Court agreed that 
there should have been a hearing for all Moutse residents in the first instance because 
of their geographic proximity to the affected boundary and their historical choice to 
remain part of Mpumalanga but also acknowledged that a hearing was eventually 
granted to them in amends.169
 Applicants went on to argue that, because of a short notice period and hearing 
duration, the hearing was inadequate to fulfill the legislature’s public participation 
duty.170 Developing a point already made in Doctors for Life, the Court drew a 
connection between meaningful participation and the timing of public invitation:
Two principles may be deduced . . . . The first is that the interested parties must 
be given adequate time to prepare for a hearing. The second relates to the time 
or stage when the hearing is permitted, which must be before the final decision 
is taken. These principles ensure that meaningful participation is allowed. It 
must be an opportunity capable of influencing the decision to be taken.171
As will be discussed in the next section, inadequate notice periods not only affect how 
meaningful participation will be but are also an obstacle to people’s ability to make use 
of participation opportunities in the first place. In the Moutse case, however, the 
Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ arguments about a short notice period 
and hearing duration because they had already engaged with the bill long before the 
public hearing, which apparently ended when all comments were finished.172
 In relation to the TCB, although some civil society groups had been engaging 
with the bill since it was first introduced in 2008, many stakeholders made it known 
in their submissions that they only became aware of the bill’s reintroduction upon 
being notified of provincial legislature hearings in April and May of 2012. Some 
165. Id. at paras. 53–54.
166. Id. at paras. 54–55.
167. Id.
168. Id. at paras. 56–60. The Court notes that the “discrete group” argument originated in Matatiele. Id. at 
57; see also Matatiele Municipality v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC) at para. 
68.
169. Moutse Demarcation Forum, 2011 (11) BCLR 1158 at paras. 59–60.
170. See id. at para. 65.
171. Id. at para. 62.
172. See id. at paras. 63–67.
544
“The AdverT WAs PuT uP YesTerdAY” NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 | 2015/16
stakeholders only became aware of the bill through networks with other civil society 
organizations.173 Several complained about the short notification periods.174 There 
were also accounts of inadequate hearing durations175—in one case, a hearing was 
abruptly ended and oral submissions closed after a traditional leader spoke in favor of 
the bill.176 By the Constitutional Court’s own reasoning, there is thus an argument to 
be made that these circumstances undermined the meaningfulness of public 
participation processes on the TCB.
 The Moutse applicants’ final attack was on the revised report tabled by the 
Mpumalanga legislature’s committee.177 Again, the Court dismissed their argument, 
stating that it was within the mandate and decisionmaking role of the committee to 
reduce the submissions it had received into a summary report.178
 What does this last finding mean in relation to the Select Committee’s initial 
acceptance of the DOJCD’s selective summary of TCB submissions? While the 
Moutse decision suggests that the Select Committee had the authority to decide how 
submissions should be reported, it is precisely because the DOJCD—not the Select 
Committee—made the decision to summarize two submissions and ignore others 
that the initial acceptance of the DOJCD summary is so procedurally offensive. It is 
further questionable whether an analysis of only a small fraction of submissions could 
ever be a “summary” of public participation proceedings. Reservations about the 
DOJCD “summary” were later addressed by the Select Committee, which then 
tabled its own more comprehensive summary of the submissions.179
 While the TCB legislative process provided opportunities for public participation 
and some people were able to make use of them, certain circumstances arguably 
undermined the meaningfulness of the opportunities taken. If the bill is revived and 
becomes enforceable law in the future, this issue may have to be explored further in 
court. A related issue is whether people were able to make use of participation 
opportunities in the first place.
  5. Making Use of Participation Opportunities
 As stated earlier, part of the reasonableness inquiry set out in Doctors for Life 
requires consideration of whether people were actually able to make use of 
opportunities for public participation. The Constitutional Court has highlighted 
173. Thipe, supra note 7, at 6.
174. Luwaya, supra note 68, at 15 –18.
175. See id. at 10–11.
176. See id. at 13–14; Pearlie Joubert, King has Final Word, City Press (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.news24.
com/Archives/City-Press/King-has-final-word-20150430.
177. Moutse Demarcation Forum, 2011 (11) BCLR 1158 at para. 68.
178. See id. at paras. 73–75. Interestingly, the Court accounted for the separate powers of legislative branches 
of government by stating further that “it is undesirable for this Court to prescribe to the Legislature 
what a report to it should contain.” Id. at 80.
179. See Committee Report on Public Hearings, supra note 86.
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that public participation opportunities cannot be effective without adequate 
information,180 prior notice,181 and access to relevant spaces.182 The ability of people 
other than traditional leaders to participate in public comment procedures was 
severely hampered by the failure of the TCB legislative process to take into account 
the circumstances of people who would most directly be affected by the bill.
 In Doctors for Life, the Constitutional Court noted the link between the right to 
political participation and the right to freedom of expression or information.183 In 
elaborating on the legislature’s duty to facilitate public involvement, the Court thus 
stated that “public involvement may be seen as ‘a continuum that ranges from 
providing information and building awareness, to partnering in decision-making.’”184 
As examples, the Court said Parliament could facilitate participation through road 
shows, workshops, media broadcasts, and publications aimed at educating the public 
on issues before Parliament.185 While access to information is crucial to effective 
participation,186 an emphasis on public education campaigns has the potential to 
sidestep the actual participation that should be facilitated. Perhaps the focus should 
be less on teaching the public about the issues before Parliament, and more on the 
mutual sharing of knowledge and ideas between Parliament and the public. 
Parliamentarians should thus be open to imparting and receiving information when 
engaging with their constituents. As highlighted in Merafong, without Parliament’s 
genuine willingness to hear and consider the views of the public, the right to 
participation would be meaningless.187
 This principle of sharing knowledge, and recognizing the value of and engaging 
with different knowledges, was absent from many of the provincial and national 
TCB hearings. At the provincial hearings, “the presentation of the Bill’s substantive 
content consisted of a guided explanation of the Bill, given by either a ‘legal advisor’ 
or a member of the legislature.”188 Only sections of the bill that were identified as 
important were explained, which in most cases amounted to the reading or translation 
of the bill’s clauses, or of a translated summary document.189 Since the presenters 
guided the focus of the explanation, “contentious and heavily criticized provisions 
 . . . . received only a cursory mention” without being unpacked or discussed further.190 
180. See Doctors for Life Int’ l v. Speaker of the Nat’ l Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at para. 131.
181. See id. at paras. 170–71.
182. See id. at para. 137.
183. Id. at paras. 91–92, 106.
184. Id. at para. 129.
185. Id. at para. 132; see also PMG Overview, supra note 79, at 25.
186. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 221 (stating that the dissemination of information about 
pending legislation is a basic element of public involvement).
187. Merafong Demarcation Forum v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC) at para. 51.
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The records of observers who attended the hearings “show that the presentation and 
explanation of the Bill was not satisfactory at any of the hearings.”191 “The sessions 
that preceded some hearings were used to justify the inadequate explanation of the 
Bill,” and at many hearings, presenters from the legislatures argued that “hearings 
were about obtaining people’s views” and not about giving people a detailed 
explanation of the bill’s content.192
 At some of the hearings, people were instructed to speak to a particular provision 
in the bill.193 Such instructions meant that only those who were familiar with the 
specific provision could speak freely.194
 The difficulty of speaking to specific provisions was exacerbated because many 
people could not study the bill prior to the hearings.195 In some provinces, including 
those where public education preceded the hearings, people complained that there 
had been insufficient time to fully comprehend the bill’s implications.196 In addition, 
people tried to make submissions in which they spoke generally about how the bill 
would worsen their circumstances, but their contributions were deemed irrelevant.197
 Surely these circumstances prevent the genuine exchange of knowledge between 
parliamentarians and people? A lack of detailed prior information about the TCB 
would have silenced or rendered irrelevant numerous valuable insights during public 
hearings that could have enriched later legislative debates on the bill.
 The need for prior information is closely linked to the need for adequate notice. 
In Doctors for Life, the Constitutional Court said short notice of a meeting left 
insufficient time to properly scrutinize laws before discussion.198 As alleged in the 
Moutse case, this also detracts from the meaningfulness of the consultation and turns 
public participation into a charade.199 The Court acknowledged that there may be 
times when shortcuts are necessary, but urgency would have to be shown to prove the 
reasonableness of Parliament’s conduct: “[W]hen it comes to establishing legislative 
timetables, the temptation to cut down on public involvement must be resisted . . . 
The timetable must be subordinated to the rights guaranteed in the Constitution, 
and not the rights to the timetable.”200
191. Id.
192. Id. at 6–7.
193. See id. at 7, 11. One of the authors, Nolundi Luwaya, who attended many of the provincial hearings, also 
witnessed this.
194. See id. at 11. These instructions did not seem to apply to traditional leaders, who were able to speak 




198. Doctors for Life Int’ l v. Speaker of the Nat’ l Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at paras. 170–71.
199. Moutse Demarcation Forum v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2011 (11) BCLR 1158 (CC) at paras. 
61–62.
200. Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 194.
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 At least one province was unhappy with the time allocated by the NCOP Select 
Committee for provincial participation on the TCB.201 Mpumalanga failed to submit 
a negotiating mandate after provincial hearings in 2012 and, in a letter to the 
Chairperson of the NCOP, requested that debates on the TCB be postponed for 
further consultation on the bill.202 This is perhaps indicative of the legislative body’s 
own assessment that participation was being unreasonably rushed. Last-minute 
changes to legislative schedules and venues, as occurred during consultation on the 
TCB, are also arguably inconsistent with the duty to facilitate public involvement in 
the legislative process.
 In certain provinces, people raised serious objections about the advertisement of 
hearings on the TCB. When asked by monitors, many people in Mpumalanga did 
not know that the provincial legislature had arranged public hearings on the bill.203 
In Badplaas, Mpumalanga, members of surrounding communities traveled to an 
advertised venue only to learn after waiting for more than an hour that the venue had 
been changed to the Mpfuluzi Hall in Mayflower, approximately forty kilometers 
away.204 A representative from the Local House of Traditional Leaders complained 
that traditional leaders would have attended in greater numbers if they had been 
aware of the meeting.205
 In KwaZulu-Natal, some members of the public were forced to reroute after hearing 
about a venue change on their way to a hearing in Port Shepstone.206 For many, the 
venue change meant additional travel time and cost, since the hearing was moved from 
a venue accessible to those from surrounding rural areas to the city center.207
 In the Northern Cape, participants said that a hearing was advertised at very 
short notice and the venue was inconvenient, while one traditional leader said that he 
had heard about the hearing only one day before it was held.208 One member of the 
public recounted finding out about the hearing:
201. Select Comm. Sec’y, supra note 92, at §§ 2.1, 2.2. Members of Parliament in NCOP committees seem 
to have complained generally of short time periods for briefings and debates on legislation. See PMG 
Overview, supra note 79, at 18.
202. See Letter from Hon. VS Siwela, Acting Speaker, Mpumalanga Provincial Legislature, to the 
Chairperson of the NCOP (May 29, 2012), http://www.pmg.org.za/files/doc/2012/120530negotiating.
pdf; see also PMG 2012 Briefings, supra note 74.




207. Id. at 15–16.
208. Id. at 17.
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I was walking in town today and saw posters saying there is a public hearing. 
The advert was put up yesterday. Today I’m told that I have 10 minutes to 
read through it and vote on the Bill. This Bill says I can work for free for a 
chief. How can such a decision be done in 10 minutes?209
Complaints about “the advertising of the hearings and the choice of venues surfaced 
repeatedly” across the provinces.210 These issues seem to reflect a broader problem of 
poor communication by Parliament.211
 Last-minute venue changes impede the ability of people to physically access 
public hearings. Venues that are far away from the people most directly affected by 
legislation, or difficult or expensive to travel to, have the same effect. Parliament has 
acknowledged the inadequacy of “infrastructure and space” for public participation 
processes even within its own buildings.212 The Bafokeng Land Buyers’ Association 
submitted as follows:
It is the intention of the Association and other members of the affected 
public, to hold a peaceful public demonstration, not only against the passing 
of the bill by our North West Provincial Legislature, but also against the 
silent endorsement and ‘blackout’ by our traditional authorities on such 
important bills. Due to resource and time constraints, concerned members 
will not be able to travel 180km to Mahikeng, the seat of the North West 
Provincial Legislature, to make their submissions, a  fault that mainly lies 
with the Provincial Legislature for  failing to provide  for adequate public 
involvement.213
 In Doctors for Life, the Constitutional Court recognized the importance of 
physical access to meetings of Parliament,214 where parliamentarians are briefed by 
government departments and laws are deliberated.215 It is true that public access to 
parliamentary business contributes to the openness of lawmaking and is thus a crucial 
element of participatory democracy. What the Court does not articulate, however, is 
the role played by political processes occurring on the sidelines of Parliament’s 
official spaces. The political landscape in which legislation will be drafted is often 
sculpted in hallways or at breakfast tables outside of Parliament’s meeting venues. 
These political dynamics are unrecorded, invisible to the public, and only accessible 
to a portion of civil society organizations or journalists.
209. Id. at 17. Members of the public made similar complaints in public hearings about short notice periods 
for submitting comments on other bills before Parliament. See PMG Overview, supra note 79, at 25.
210. Luwaya, supra note 68, at 16.
211. See PMG Overview, supra note 79, at 25.
212. Id. at 5.
213. Letter from Othusitse Rapoo, Sec’y, Bafokeng Land Buyers’ Ass’n, to the Speaker, North West 
Provincial Legislature (Feb. 6, 2012), http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/doc/ 
2012/120921bafokeng.pdf.
214. Sections 59, 72 and 118 of the Constitution generally require legislative buildings and meetings to be 
open to the public.
215. Doctors for Life Intl. v. Speaker of the Nat’ l Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at para. 137.
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 During the NCOP process on the TCB, some civil society organizations 
suspected that political concerns were delaying the Select Committee’s consideration 
of initial negotiating mandates and causing the unusual authorization of a second 
round of provincial hearings.216 With respect to the latter, the Alliance for Rural 
Democracy and the Tshintsha Amakhaya platform issued a joint statement asserting 
that the Committee was acting on “pressure from the Executive not to withdraw the 
TCB.”217
 Responses to the TCB consultation process illustrate that open access to 
Parliament and its meetings does not guarantee participation as the Court suggests,218 
because attendance in Cape Town requires time and resources that many South 
Africans do not have. The proximity of provincial legislatures to their constituencies 
is important for precisely this reason.219 If members of the public are unable to attend 
even provincial lawmaking forums, they have to rely on media reports for up-to-date 
information on legislative processes. They are also then limited to the submission of 
written proposals—a problem for those who are illiterate or lack formal education.
 Several written submissions on the TCB showed that participation did not 
depend only on an ability to physically reach hearings, but also on an ability to speak 
freely at the hearings. In this broader context, access is shaped by political dynamics 
and power relations. Women’s voices in particular were suppressed at many public 
hearings.220 The presence of traditional leaders in some provincial hearings had a 
clear impact on the atmosphere and how people framed their inputs.221 At hearings 
across the country, although particularly in the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga, 
people were reprimanded for their conduct in relation to the traditional leaders in 
attendance.222 In KwaZulu-Natal, the special treatment of traditional leaders was 
characterized by displays of great deference, including stopping proceedings to 
introduce traditional leaders who arrived late and giving special thanks for their 
attendance.223
 Traditional leaders’ participation varied from province to province and from 
hearing to hearing. Much of their participation took the form of closing remarks and 
rebuttals to what people had said. In Mthatha, Eastern Cape, a traditional leader 
said he supported the bill, adding that what he supported, all his people also 
supported.224 He warned that any person who did not support the bill was not under 
216. See Media Release, All. for Rural Democracy, supra note 96.
217. Media Release, All. for Rural Democracy and Tshintsha Amakhaya Platform, supra note 90.
218. See Doctors for Life, 2006 (6) SA 416 at para. 161.
219. See id.
220. PMG Overview, supra note 79, at 19, 25.
221. Luwaya, supra note 68, at 9.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 9–10.
224. Id. at 13; Joubert, supra note 176. 
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his chieftaincy.225 This could be interpreted as a threat of expulsion against people 
living in the traditional community that he led. There were, however, other hearings 
in which traditional leaders did not participate.
 Although the reasons are not clear, at some hearings the provincial government 
made a point of saying that the bill had been taken to the National House of 
Traditional Leaders (NHTL), and to corresponding Provincial Houses.226 Traditional 
leaders had therefore already been given “an opportunity to engage with the Bill.”227 
At two hearings in Limpopo, members of the provincial legislature noted that there 
had been a meeting prior to the official public hearing meeting that was attended 
exclusively by traditional leaders, who then only spoke at one of the later public 
hearings.228 At the meeting in which the traditional leaders did not speak, it was 
observed that traditional leaders were still compensated for the transportation costs 
they had incurred to attend.229 No such accommodation seemed to be made for other 
participants.230
 Thus, the hearings illustrate the extent to which people want to be part of 
legislative processes and their willingness to overcome significant obstacles to make 
their opinions heard. Some people had to travel great distances using unreliable and 
costly public transport; many others were not familiar with the bill and had their 
inputs subjected to restrictions, and still others were informed of hearing schedules 
and venues at unreasonably short notice. Despite these circumstances, they fought to 
tell their stories and express their dissatisfaction with the bill and its implications as 
they understood them.
Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 Consultation processes around the TCB have failed to adequately facilitate 
meaningful participation by the public, as is required by the Constitution.231 Public 
responses to the bill underline how the exclusion of voices at different points of the 
process substantively compromised the bill’s content and legitimacy—in particular, 
its ability to promote living customary law. The silencing of large segments of the 
public during the TCB drafting process resulted in a bill that could not speak to or 
for the majority. The active and passive undermining of public participation in the 
legislative process suggests that a similar outcome would have resulted if the TCB 
had made it through Parliament.
 Notwithstanding these problems, individuals’ and organizations’ endeavors to 
voice their opposition to the TCB meant that no outright majority in favor of the bill 
225. Luwaya, supra note 68, at 13.
226. Id. at 14.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 17.
230. See id.
231. S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 59, 72, 118.
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could be achieved among the provinces in the NCOP. This is a testament not only to 
the ability of the NCOP to be a platform for enriched, grounded, and comprehensive 
debates on legislation, rather than merely a “rubber stamp” for the National 
Assembly,232 but also to the power of public participation in the lawmaking process 
more broadly. Even when deficiently implemented, public involvement can 
significantly influence a bill’s passage through Parliament.
232. This has been asserted by the NCOP. See PMG Overview, supra note 79, at 22; see also Media Release, 
All. for Rural Democracy and the Tshintsha Amakhaya Platform, supra note 90.
